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This study designs a natural field experiment linked to a controlled laboratory experiment to 
examine the effectiveness of matching gifts and challenge gifts, two popular strategies used 
to secure a portion of the $200 billion annually given to charities. We find evidence that 
challenge gifts positively influence contributions in the field, but matching gifts do not. 
Methodologically, we find important similarities and dissimilarities between behavior in the lab 
and the field. Overall, our results have clear implications for fundraisers and provide avenues 
for future empirical and theoretical work on charitable giving. 
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improved the manuscript. 1. Introduction 
Charitable fundraising remains an important matter for the international 
community and more narrowly in the U.S., where the American Association of 
Fundraising Counsel estimates that total contributions to American philanthropic 
organizations in the year 2000 exceeded 2 percent of GDP. Dove (2000) reports 
that there is at least one capital campaign under way in virtually every major 
population center in North America that has an objective of raising between $25 
million and $100 million. Smaller capital campaigns are even more numerous. 
Fundraisers have developed a variety of strategies aimed at successfully 
reaching specific funding targets, but to date, little is known empirically about the 
demand side of charitable fundraising. For example, without more than a handful 
of anecdotes, professional fundraising consultants strongly assert that “leadership 
gifts” are an important step towards a broader public campaign.
1 Such leadership 
contributions typically take one of two forms: challenge gifts and matching gifts. 
A challenge gift is an unconditional commitment by a donor, or set of 
donors, to provide a given sum of money to the cause. Professional fundraising 
consultants advise seeking at least 10% and up to 80% of the overall objective of 
a capital campaign through leadership gifts before embarking on the public phase 
of fundraising (Lawson, 2001). Alternatively, a matching gift is a conditional 
                                                           
1 Leadership gifts should be distinguished from rebate mechanisms such as tax deductions, 
whereby charitable contributions can be used to reduce one’s tax burden. There is an extensive 
literature estimating price elasticities of such government-sponsored tools (see, e.g., Randolph, 
1995; Auten et al., 2002), and it is fair to say that the empirical estimates vary widely. 
 
  2commitment by the leadership donor(s) to match the contributions of others at a 
given rate, up to the maximum amount the leadership donor is prepared to give. 
While the rate of matching is typically the result of an agreement between the 
fundraiser and the leadership donor, received wisdom suggests that presenting 
less than a 1:2 matching ratio (one leadership dollar for every two dollars 
contributed by other donors) has noticeably less power to leverage other 
contributions than more generous matching rates (e.g., 1:1 or 2:1) (Dove, 2000). 
Interestingly, these “rules of thumb” are largely anecdotal. Only recently 
have economists begun to formally examine such claims. For example, List and 
Lucking-Reiley (2002) find that challenge gifts announced by the fundraiser 
influence charitable contributions. Landry et al. (2006) report data from a door-to-
door fundraising drive that suggests challenge gifts increase conditional 
contributions. Meier (2007) finds that a matching contribution has an immediate 
positive effect on charitable contributions, but notes that the net long run effect is 
to reduce the overall level of contribution of the group when individuals are given 
repeated opportunities to give. Karlan and List (2007) also obtain mixed results 
on the effect of matching gifts:  matching is shown to have a significant effect on 
the contributions of some but not all groups of potential donors. The relative 
efficacy of challenge and matching gifts, however, has not to our knowledge been 
studied systematically, neither in the field nor in the laboratory.
2   
                                                           
2 In a much different environment and context, Eckel and Grossman (2003) compare matching to 
an equivalent rebate of one’s contributions in a laboratory dictator game and find that matching 
contributions lead to significantly larger contributions than the rebate mechanism. The interested 
  3Our first objective is to perform such a comparison in a natural field 
experiment (see the classification scheme in Harrison and List, 2004) using four 
parallel fundraising appeals conducted as part of the British Columbia Chapter of 
the Sierra Club of Canada’s normal fundraising efforts. Using direct mail 
solicitation, 3,000 Sierra Club supporters were randomly divided into four 
treatments and asked to support the expansion of a K-12 environmental education 
program. We designed the experiment in an effort to provide a clean test of the 
absolute and relative efficacy of challenge and matching gifts.  
We report some potentially useful insights. We observe that a challenge 
gift attracted 23% more donors and increased total dollar contributions 18% when 
compared to the identical campaign in which no announcement of leadership gift 
was made. While the number of donors was also higher in the matching treatment, 
average and total donations under matching were actually lower than in the 
challenge and control treatments. We also find that increasing the monetary target 
of the fundraising campaign has a significant effect on the size of the average gift.  
Our second objective is to compare these insights with those gained from 
a controlled laboratory experiment. The combination of lab and field data 
provides a deeper understanding than either approach could provide in isolation. 
Such an exercise also permits an exploration of an important issue facing 
experimental economists: whether behavior inside the laboratory is a good 
indicator of behavior outside the laboratory.  
                                                                                                                                                                
reader should also see Frey and Meier (2004), Shang and Croson (2005), Falk (2007), or the 
survey on field experiments on charitable giving in List (2006). 
  4We report empirical results from five laboratory treatments, revealing a 
mix of similarities and differences with data from the field experiment. One 
difference is that contrary to our observations from the field, the rate of 
participation in the laboratory (giving to the public good) is nearly 100%—i.e., a 
strong majority of subjects give something to the public good. A second result is 
the close correspondence between the relative rankings of monies raised in the lab 
and the field:  in terms of relative mechanism performance, the lab and field data 
share strong similarities. Third, while the field results show that donors respond 
strongly to the change in the cost of the program, the laboratory treatments offer 
mixed evidence on the extent of this effect. Combining insights from the lab and 
the field provides evidence consistent with the notion that solicitees in the field 
viewed the stated monetary goal as a signal of the quality of the public good to be 
provided. 
  52. Controlled Fundraising Campaigns in the Field 
2.1 Design 
  In June 2004, the British Columbia chapter of the Sierra Club of Canada 
mounted four parallel fundraising campaigns in an effort to expand their K-12 
environmental education programs. This chapter of the Sierra Club typically 
appeals to its members and supporters to send tax-deductible donations three to 
four times per year. Our field experiment was one of those fundraising drives, and 
the basic design is inspired by both fundraising practices and previous laboratory 
threshold public goods experiments (for recent examples, see Rondeau et al. 
1999; List and Rondeau, 2003, Rondeau et al., 2005).  
A total of 3,000 Sierra Club supporters were randomly divided into four 
treatments. Supporters received a solicitation letter from the director of the Club, 
written, as usual, on Sierra Club letterhead and accompanied by a payment return 
card of a format typically used by the Club in its fundraising. The letter explained 
the Club’s objective of expanding its existing K-12 environmental education 
program to increase the number of students it reaches by at least 200. We 
designed our solicitation as a threshold public good with a money-back guarantee. 
All pledge letters specified that 750 supporters were being solicited and that the 
program would be expanded only if a specified minimum amount of money was 
raised. In three of the treatments, the total amount of money required was set at 
$5,000. In the fourth treatment letter, the announced threshold was $2,500.  
  6Importantly, in all cases, it was clearly indicated that if the minimum 
amount required was not received, individual contributions would be returned to 
donors. The inclusion of a money-back guarantee in a threshold public good 
campaign is not an everyday occurrence, but motivated by other uses in the field 
(e.g., Manitoba’s New Democratic Party, the Association of Oregon Faculties, 
and Office coffee clubs—see List and Lucking-Reiley) and the findings of 
Rondeau et al. (1999, 2005), which reveal that under a range of conditions, the 
combination of a threshold and money-back-guarantee significantly increases 
contributions in laboratory experiments.  
More importantly, this design choice provides a level playing field for the 
relative test of efficacy across the challenge and matching gift treatments under a 
theory of signaling (Vesterlund, 2003; Andreoni, 2006). This intuition holds 
because if leadership gifts actually signal the type and value of the public good, 
they should increase contributions relative to the case with no announced 
leadership gifts.
3  With the inclusion of a money-back guarantee, both challenge 
                                                           
3 One simple mechanism underlying this effect is that when a large donor believes in the project 
by giving a gift this informational value affects an agent’s beliefs regarding the value of the public 
good. Andreoni (1998) discusses a different effect of challenge monies:  his model of charitable 
giving for a threshold public good has multiple equilibria, and in the absence of seed money there 
exists a Nash equilibrium with zero charitable giving. The zero-contribution equilibrium can be 
eliminated, however, by initial commitments of seed money, which lower the remaining amount 
needed to be raised in the public fundraising campaign. Thus, in his model seed money is used as 
an elimination device rather than as a credibility device.  
  7gifts and matching gifts yield equivalent outcomes whether or not the threshold 
goal is reached.
4   
Solicitation letters also explained that any amount of money collected in 
excess of the threshold would serve to further increase the number of students 
reached by the program (at the rate of one additional classroom for each $775 
received). The four treatments were: 
-  a “High Control” (HC) group, in which the full amount of $5,000 is 
solicited from the members receiving the letter; 
-  a “Challenge” (CH) treatment, in which $5,000 has to be raised, but 
where a leading donor has already committed $2,500 in a challenge 
gift to the cause; 
-  a “Matching” (MA) treatment, where $5,000 has to be raised, but 
where a leading donor has committed to match the first $2,500 in 
contributions at a rate of 1:1; 
-  a “Low Control” (LC) treatment, in which the existence of a 
leadership gift is not announced but where $2,500 is requested from 
donors.  
 
We provide verbatim copies of the letters in the supplementary material found on 
the journal’s website. Key portions of the payment mechanism and treatment 
variations are reproduced here:   
This year one of the main goals of the Sierra Club is to expand the 
scope of our environmental education program. This is why you are 
one of 750 Sierra Club supporters receiving this letter.  
 
                                                           
4 For example, if the threshold (goal) is not reached, all donations from the solicitees are refunded 
in both cases. Alternatively, if the goal is reached, in each case the full amount of the leadership 
gift is used to help fund the public good. Thus, the money-back guarantee serves to remove the 
conditionality inherent in the matching gift solicitation if the goal is not reached. The money-back 
guarantee therefore serves to equalize the price of giving over all ranges of giving for this 
particular public good. An astute reader might wonder in practice how a money-back guarantee 
influences the leadership gift. Following standard practices, a challenge gift remains with the 
charity but are used for other undefined purpose. Alternatively, the matching monies are not 
received. 
  8If we raise $5,000, we could prepare and deliver our education 
program to an additional 200 children across the province. So we are 
appealing to donors like you to help us raise the $5,000 needed to 
expand the program. 
 
But wait, we can do even more! If we receive more than $5,000 from 
this group of 750 supporters, we will be able to reach an even greater 
number of students. With each extra $775 we can deliver the 
program to one additional classroom. 
 
On the other hand, if we fail to raise $5,000 from our supporters we 
will not be able to bring the gift of environmental education to more 
children this year, and we will refund your donation to you. 
 
In the LC treatment, the letter was in all respects identical except that all instances 
of “$5,000” were replaced by $2,500.
5  In the matching treatment, the second 
paragraph above became: 
If we raise $5,000, we could prepare and deliver our education 
program to an additional 200 children across the province. The great 
news is that we have already received a commitment of $2,500 in 
matching donations. This means that for each of the first $2,500 we 
receive from supporters like you, we will also receive another 
dollar and double the impact of your donation.  So we are 
appealing to donors like you to help us raise the $2,500 needed to 
expand the program. 
 
In addition, the residual amount of money required mentioned in the last two 
paragraphs ($5,000) was changed to $2,500. Similar modifications were made for 
the challenge treatment: 
If we raise $5,000, we could prepare and deliver our education program to 
an additional 200 children across the province. The great news is that we 
have already received a commitment of $2,500 in start-up money. So we 
are appealing to donors like you to help us raise the $2,500 needed to 
expand the program. 
                                                           
5 The Sierra Club committed the additional $2500 necessary to reach 200 children if they raised 
$2,500 in this treatment. 
  9Together, these four treatments represent experimental cells that, to our 
knowledge, have not been explored heretofore and allow for the testing of 
hypotheses:  i) the size of a threshold affects giving; ii)  announcing a lead gift 
increases contributions; and iii) the form of the lead gift will affect contributions.  
2.2 Results 
A quick overview of the results can be gleaned from the summary data 
shown in Table 1.
6  One clear pattern is that the challenge (CH) treatment raises 
considerably more money than the other three treatments: the $1,620 raised is 
18%, 31%, and 71% higher than the total amount raised in the HC, MA, and LC 
treatments, respectively. The donation of those who answered the different 
appeals (overall mean, conditional on giving) varies from $45.83 in the HC 
treatment to a low of $27.79 in the LC group. The average donation in the CH 
treatment, at $43.78, is comparable to that of the HC treatment, whereas the 
average donation in the MA treatment ($34.31) is closer to the amount observed 
in the LC treatment. Considering mean conditional contributions, Tables 2 and 3 
provide the results of pair-wise tests of equality of the mean donations and of 
homogeneity of the distributions. 
--- INSERT TABLES 1, 2 and 3  HERE --- 
Examination of the data reveals that (1) there is a strong threshold effect—
decreasing the announced cost of the good significantly decreases contributions; 
(2) consistent with anecdotal evidence and past field results, we find that the use 
                                                           
6 Our results concerning the challenge treatment would be stronger, but we excluded one 
contribution of $400 from the challenge treatment because the donor later retracted her check 
citing that she had made a mistake when contributing. 
  10of challenge funds has a positive influence on contributions—the challenge 
treatment yielded a participation rate 23% (9%) higher and overall contributions 
18% (71%) higher than the High (Low) Control treatment; and (3) matching 
donations provides no advantage to the fundraiser, yet monies raised are not 
significantly lower than the challenge treatment. We consider each result in turn.  
2.2.1 Strong Threshold Effect in the Field 
  The HC treatment raised $1,375, whereas the LC treatment raised $945. 
Neither treatment mentions a leadership gift. The only difference between the two 
appeals is the minimum amount of donations required to expand the education 
program ($5,000 in the HC treatment versus $2,500 in the LC treatment).  
  Since the LC treatment induced a slightly higher response rate, the 
observed difference in the total amount received is attributable to larger 
individual donations in the HC treatment. The difference between the mean 
contribution of $45.83 in the HC treatment and $27.79 in the LC treatment 
represents an increase of roughly 65%, and is statistically significant at the p < 
0.02 level using a two-tailed t-test (A generalized rank-sum test of distribution 
homogeneity rejects the null hypothesis that the two distributions are identical at 
the p < 0.08 level).
7  
                                                           
7 This generalized rank-sum test, which is described in Hoel (1971), is less restrictive than other 
non-parametric tests (e.g., a Mann-Whitney test) in that it requires no assumption about the shape 
of the underlying distribution being tested. 
  11These results suggest that the size of contributions is positively correlated 
with the threshold level.
8 Such a finding is consistent with the notion that 
individual donors place a greater weight on the expressed need of the Sierra Club 
than on the “price” of the education program (or the benefit-cost ratio of the 
program, which was twice as large in the LC treatment compared to the HC 
treatment). 
Despite the fact that Sierra Club members did not have information about 
the value of the public good to others, the observed threshold effect is also 
consistent with the Nash prediction for contributions in a provision point game 
with complete information (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989). In the efficient equilibria 
of this game, the sum of contributions equals the cost of the good (and each 
individual contributes no more than his value). Incentives to free-ride remain, 
however. Thus, the theoretical prediction implies an increase in the average 
contribution with the increase in the threshold provided the threshold remains 
lower than total benefits. Though we observe the static result, group contributions 
did not reach the threshold.
9   
2.2.2  The Challenge Gift Increases Total Contributions 
                                                           
8 As an astute reviewer noted, this cannot be a general result since an enormous goal would likely 
lead to few contributions. We concur with this intuition. 
9 The $5,000 threshold level had been conservatively chosen by the Sierra Club on the basis of 
their historical records on donor rate of response (13%-14%) and average donation (greater than 
$50). This fund raising effort produced much lower response rates and contributions. However, a 
regular fund raising effort conducted simultaneously by the Club with a different subset of its 
members produced an even smaller rate of response and smaller contributions. Club staff has no 
explanation for the dismal results—none of our treatments reached the threshold—but neither we 
nor they attribute it to our experimental design.  
  12  The announcement of a challenge gift yielded $1,620 compared to the 
$1,375 raised from the HC group. This difference in overall contributions is not 
due to an increase in average contributions, as the average gift conditional on 
giving was $43.78 and $45.83 in the CH and HC treatments, respectively. Rather, 
it is driven by the 23% difference in the participation rates across the two 
treatments and the fact that the number of “large” gifts (gifts of $50 or more) is 
27% greater in the challenge treatment. Both of these results are consistent with 
the empirical results of List and Lucking-Reiley (2002). 
    Further insights on the usefulness of challenge gifts can be obtained from 
comparing contributions when a challenge gift is announced (CH treatment) to 
outcomes of a campaign where an amount equivalent to the challenge gift has 
been secured by the fundraiser but not announced. The LC treatment permits this 
comparison. In this case, the effective amount of the threshold is simply reduced 
by the amount of the implicit challenge gift.  
  When comparing contributions in the LC and CH treatments the 
announced cost of the good varies between treatments, but the amount of money 
required of the solicited individuals remains constant at $2,500. This comparison 
therefore provides another measure of the value of the signal sent by the 
challenge gift. We find that the average contribution increases from $27.79 in the 
LC treatment to $43.78 when a challenge gift is announced, a difference that is 
statistically significant at the p < .02 level using a two-tailed t-test (p <0.04 using 
the generalized rank-sum test). The total amount raised also increases 71 percent, 
  13from $945 to $1,620, due not only to higher average gifts, but also to a slightly 
greater number of contributors (though the difference in the number of 
contributors - 37 versus 34 is not statistically significant via a test of proportions 
on the response rate). We believe that this experimental comparison is novel to 
the literature, and represents an important piece of the puzzle to interpret previous 
data (e.g., List and Lucking-Reiley. 2002). 
2.2.3 The Matching Gift Does Not Increase Contributions 
The data suggest that the gains from implementing a matching gift 
campaign are not as strong as the gains from a challenge gift campaign. While 
more funds were raised in the MA than in the LC treatment ($1,235 versus $945), 
the matching contributions are considerably lower than the $1,620 raised in the 
CH treatment. Furthermore, the average contribution from matching donors is not 
statistically different from any of the other three treatment means at conventional 
levels. These results provide little support for the received fundraiser view that 
announcing that individual donations will be matched on a 1:1 ratio by a leader is 
an effective way of leveraging higher donations in the public phase of the 
campaign. While the total amount contributed in the CH treatment exceeds that 
contributed in the MA treatment, none of our statistical tests can reject the null 
that the differences are due to noise.  
This result differs with those of Karlan and List (2007) and of Meier 
(2007), who find that matching significantly increases contributions. Our 
respective results are not directly comparable, however, since their campaigns did 
  14not include a threshold, nor a money back-guarantee. The voluntary contribution 
and threshold mechanisms produce radically different incentives that might 
explain the difference, but it is worth noting that both studies show that the 
impact of matching is not straightforward. Karlan and List show that it increases 
donations only in some geographical areas, and Meier finds that those who give 
under a matching condition later reduced their contributions to the same cause, 
resulting in a net reduction of total contributions. Much remains to be learned. In 
this spirit, we now turn to a set of parallel laboratory experiments.  
3. Laboratory Experiment 
While the above insights are useful for both positive and practical 
purposes it is interesting and relevant to consider whether a laboratory experiment 
with student subjects can yield similar quantitative and qualitative insights.  
There are reasons why the insights gained in the lab and in the field might 
be at odds. A recent framework by Levitt and List (2007) highlights that to the 
extent that lab and naturally-occurring environments differ on any of several 
dimensions—e.g., the nature and extent of scrutiny, the particular context in 
which a decision is embedded, and the manner in which participants are selected 
to participate—the results obtained across domains might differ. This is not to 
suggest that either domain is inferior in some manner, rather we aim to explore 
whether there are differences; and, if so, what causes such behavioral differences. 
3.1 Design 
  15In designing the laboratory experiment a first difficult question is whether 
to parallel the field treatments exactly. An alternative approach is to hold true to 
the experimental literature and set-up an environment to replicate the important 
features of the theory while maintaining a connection to the field environment of 
interest. We opted for the latter because we also aim to speak to the 
generalizability of extant laboratory results, which are typically designed to 
replicate the important features of the theory.  Thus, the design of our laboratory 
experiment closely resembles previous threshold public goods experiments 
(Rondeau et al. 1999, 2005;  List and Rondeau, 2003).  
Subjects in groups of six are given an initial endowment of $12 and asked 
to divide this amount between a private account and a group fund. Any division is 
allowed, provided the amounts in the two accounts are positive and sum to 
exactly $12. An investment is made by the group fund only if the sum of 
contributions by group members reaches a minimum threshold (the provision 
point). If the group fails to reach the threshold, all contributions are refunded. If 
the threshold is reached or exceeded, a fixed payoff (of $4.50 or $9.00 depending 
on the treatment) is paid to each member of the group. In addition, each group 
member receives an additional payoff for contributions in excess of the threshold. 
This additional payoff is paid at the rate of $0.20 per dollar of excess 
contributions.  
In all treatments, everything about the experiment was common 
knowledge with the exception of the payoffs of other players. While everyone had 
  16identical payoffs, subjects were told that they were randomly assigned to their 
payoff amounts and that others may not have the same payoff amount.
10  
--- INSERT TABLE 4 HERE --- 
Table 4 summarizes the experimental design.
11  In the High Control (HC) 
treatment, the public good was provided if a minimum of $45 was contributed to 
the group fund. If the good was funded, subjects received $9 as a fixed payoff 
plus 0.2 times the amount of excess contributions. In the Challenge Gift (CH) 
treatment the only change is that subjects were told that an amount of $22.50 had 
already been committed to the group fund by “an outside investor.” The Matching 
Gift (MA) treatment was identical to the HC and the CH treatments except for the 
fact that the first $22.50 placed in the group investment fund would be matched 
by an equal investment (a matching ratio of 1:1) from “an outside investor.”   
The Low Control (LC) and Low Control 2  (LC2) treatments provide 
useful controls for the leadership treatments and lend further insights into the 
influence of the threshold in these games. The LC treatment had a threshold of 
$22.50, benefits of $9 per subjects at the threshold, and additional payoffs of 
                                                           
10 One referee was of the opinion that since all induced values were identical, our statements to 
subjects were a mild form of deception. In fact, subjects were randomly assigned to a seat with a 
set of instructions when they entered the room; we did not say that the values were randomly 
chosen; and while all induced values were equal, the statement that other subjects "may not" have 
the same amounts does not rule out that they may.  
11 All five treatments were conducted with student subjects recruited voluntarily from first year 
introductory economics classes at the University of Victoria. HC, CH and MA are direct parallels 
to three of the four field treatments. The LC treatment matches a field treatment but these data 
were collected at a different time (i.e., with a different cohort of similarly recruited first and 
second year economics students).  While we have no reason to believe that systematic differences 
exist between subjects at these two points in time, we cannot definitively assert that this has no 
influence. 
  17$0.20 per dollar in excess of the threshold. Alternatively, LC2 had a provision 
point of $22.50, leading to fixed payoffs of $4.50, and additional payoffs of $0.20 
per dollar in excess of the threshold. The LC2 treatment therefore corresponds to 
a situation where half the money is sought in order to deliver half of the benefits.  
The experiment was implemented as a single-shot game, with students 
earning approximately CA$15 on average for a 45-minute session. At the time of 
recruitment, students were told that they would have an opportunity to earn 
money in research experiments completely unrelated to the course they were 
enrolled in and that no knowledge of economics was required to participate. Upon 
arrival at a predetermined meeting room, students were asked to read and sign a 
consent form. Communication between students from this point on was strictly 
forbidden. Written instructions were distributed, read by subjects and summarized 
orally. Individual questions were answered when necessary.  
In sum, a total of 240 students participated in the experiment in sessions of 
12, 18, or 24.  All five treatments were conducted with student subjects recruited 
voluntarily from introductory economics classes at the University of Victoria.   
Treatments HC, CH, MA, and LC are direct parallels to the four field treatments.  
Treatment LC2 is a variation for which we do not have a parallel field treatment 
since its low threshold and low benefits structure made it impractical for the 
Sierra Club.  
3.2  Results 
  18Tables 5 and 6 summarize our laboratory data. Contributions to the public 
good amount to roughly 50% of individual endowment, leading to positive 
provision of the public good in every treatment. This result is consistent with 
previous laboratory studies.  
The average contribution level in the HC, $7.53, is higher than the CH 
treatment mean of $6.84, the MA treatment mean of $5.76, and the LC treatment 
mean of $7.33. Statistical tests on these means (and medians) yield four 
observations:
12 (1) there is a threshold effect—decreasing the amount of money 
required to fund the public good strongly decreases contributions; (2) subjects 
have a strong positive reaction to the level of the induced value; (3) neither 
leadership contribution treatment raises more money than the HC treatment; and 
(4) the CH treatment raises more funds than the MA and LC treatments. In the 
following sub-sections, we review each result in more detail. 
---- INSERT TABLES 5 and 6 HERE --- 
3.2.1 Strong Threshold and Strong Induced Value Effects 
Recall that the HC and LC2 treatments are identical except for the 
threshold level of contributions at which subjects begin to receive a return from 
the group fund. This design choice ensures that the benefit-cost ratio of any sum 
of contributions leading to the provision of the public good was constant at 1.2. 
The comparison of these two treatments, therefore, allows us to isolate the effect 
                                                           
12 Jarque-Berra tests do not reject the null that the data for each treatment is normally distributed. 
Pairwise tests also fail to reject equality of variances. As a result, we only report t-tests on the 
experimental data.  
 
  19of simply reducing the level (from $45 to $22.50) at which individuals start 
obtaining benefits from the (otherwise linear) public good.  
We find that this reduction in the threshold reduced the mean contribution 
by more than 30%: from $7.53 in the HC to $5.41 in the LC2 treatment, and that 
this difference is highly significant in a two-tailed t-test (p<0.002). This is 
consistent with a strong and significant threshold effect and the results of Cadsby 
and Maynes (1999), who report that contributions in a similar threshold game are 
positively correlated with the provision point.  
The LC data can be compared to the LC2 to gauge the effect of doubling 
the personal benefits while the threshold remains constant at $22.50. Doing so 
reveals that subjects are also responsive to the benefits they stand to receive from 
the public goods. Doubling the induced value increased contributions from $5.41 
to $7.33, a difference that is significant at p<0.01.  
This result is consistent with the findings of Rondeau et al. (2005) who 
show that the contributions of laboratory subjects in similar provision point 
experiments (but where subjects have less information than in our case) respond 
positively and significantly to increases in induced value. They also show that the 
elasticity of this response is less than unity, which is also consistent with our 
results. It is also worth noting that the magnitude of the threshold and induced 
value effects essentially cancel each other out in our experiment (the equality of 
the HC and LC means cannot be rejected: p>0.74).  
  20The key difference between the lab and field results is that the field HC 
and LC contributions are significantly different while in the lab, HC and LC are 
indistinguishable, both higher than LC2.  Thus, in the lab, subjects respond to 
both a decrease in the threshold provision cost, and to an increase in its benefit-
cost ratio in a manner that cancels out the two opposing effects.  In the field, we 
observe a drop in contributions associated with the lower threshold, but no 
opposite effect.  This suggests that field participants put a greater weight on the 
threshold cost than subjects in the laboratory experiment.  This, we surmise, 
might be explained by field participants taking the stated cost as a signal of the 
quality of the good to be provided.  This might be so because the value of the 
field public good holds a far greater degree of uncertainty than that of the 
laboratory public good.  
3.2.2 Challenge and Matching Gifts Do Not Increase Contributions in the 
Laboratory 
  The CH and Ma treatments each raised smaller contributions per subject 
than the HC or LC treatments. For the MA treatment, those differences are 
statistically significant (p<0.004 that MA=HC; and p<0.02 that MA=LC). While 
the CH treatment raised more money than the MA treatment, the difference lies 
outside of the normally accepted level of statistical significance (p > 0.11). Thus, 
taken alone, the laboratory experiment provides little support for the view that 
  21leadership gifts increase the amount of funds raised.
13 It is worth keeping in mind 
that in our laboratory environment where individual benefits are known with 
certainty, a leadership gift does not carry any information on the quality of the 
public good. This is a key difference between the lab and field. Given this 
difference and the higher observed field contributions in the Challenge gift 
treatment, one possible explanation (for the difference in difference) is once again 
that the leadership gift plays a signaling role of the value of field public goods.  
  At the same time, it is interesting to note that the field and laboratory 
average contribution orderings of the HC, MA, and CH treatments generated 
identical rankings. This tends to support of the view that despite the qualitative 
differences between field and laboratory leadership gifts, the laboratory is 
potentially a useful testbed for fundraising institutions. Most importantly, this 
provides one piece of empirical evidence that the qualitative, or directional, 
insights gained from a generic lab experiment can be a useful indicator of 
treatment effects in naturally-occurring environments. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
  The popular literature on the demand side of charitable fundraising is long 
on advice and accepted wisdom but largely unsubstantiated by “hard facts”. 
Controlled experiments provide a means to explore questions heretofore 
unanswered within the area of charitable fundraising. In this study, we directly pit 
challenge gifts and matching gifts in an effort to advance our understanding of the 
                                                           
13 An interesting point of future research is to compare behavior in laboratory experiments where 
values are uncertain, but linked to the level of the leadership gift.  
  22optimal uses of leadership gifts. Our data provide some evidence on the power of 
challenge gifts in the field: they work to increase the size of individual 
contributions relative to the comparable treatments in which the same amount is 
required but no challenge is present. They may also induce greater participation.
14   
  We view our set of experiments as also making a broader methodological 
point and playing a dual role in the research discovery process. First, field 
experiments are capable of providing evidence on the generalizability of 
laboratory evidence. Importantly, we find that the qualitative insights gained from 
the laboratory are quite similar to those found in the field. Second, our lab 
experiment helped to uncover the causes and underlying conditions necessary to 
produce the data patterns observed in the field. Viewed in this light, our results 
should have practical import for fundraisers as well as positive and normative 
implications for economists. Our contribution also highlights the 
complementarities that lab and field experiments provide, as stronger inference 
can be made when combining the most attractive features of each approach.  
                                                           
14 While this latter effect might not be as important when soliciting from a “warm” list of 
contributors, it is invaluable when soliciting from a “cold” list since fundraisers understand that 
attracting a first donation from an individual is also identifying a new supporter, a crucial element 
in ensuring the long-term viability of a charity. Indeed, fundraising strategists typically rank 
building a “donor development pyramid” as the most important aspect of a successful long-term 
fundraising effort. 
  23References 
 
Andreoni, J. (2006). Leadership Giving in Charitable Fundraising. Journal of 
Public Economic Theory 8(1): 1-22. 
Andreoni, J. (1998). Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising. Journal of 
Political Economy, 106(6): 1186-1213. 
Auten, G., H. Sieg, C.T. Clotfelter. (2002). Charitable Giving, Income and Taxes: 
An Analysis of Panel Data. American Economic Review, 92: 371-82. 
Bagnoli, Mark, and Barton L. Lipman. (1989). Provision of Public Goods: Fully 
Implementing the Core through Private Contributions,” Review of 
Economic Studies, 56: 583-601. 
Cadsby, C.B. and E. Maynes. (1999). Voluntary provision of threshold public 
goods with continuous contributions: experimental evidence, Journal of 
Public Economics 71, 53-73. 
Dove K.E. (2000). Conducting a Successful Capital Campaign. 2nd edition. San 
Francisco, Jossey-Bass. 510pp. 
Eckel, Catherine C. and Phillip J. Grossman. (2003). “Rebate versus Matching: 
Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?,” Journal of 
Public Economics, 87, 681–701. 
Falk, Armin. (2007). “Gift-Exchange in the Field." Econometrica 75(5):1501-
1511. 
Frey, Bruno S. and Stephan Meier. (2004). "Social Comparisons and Pro-social 
Behavior: Testing Conditional Cooperation in a Field Experiment." 
American Economic Review 94(5): 1717-1722. 
Hoel, P.G. (1971). Introduction to Mathematical Statistics, 4th Edition, John 
Wiley and Sons.  
Karlan Dean and John A. List. (2007). "Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? 
Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment.” American 
Economic Review 97(5): 1774-1793.  
  Harrison, Glenn and John A. List. (2004).  "Field Experiments," Journal of 
Economic Literature, XLII (December): pp. 1013-1059. 
Landry, C., A. Lange, J.A. List, M.K. Price, and Nicholas Rupp. (2006). "Toward 
an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (2): 747-782. 
Lawson, C.E. (2001). “Capital Fund Appeals,” in J.M. Greenfield, ed., The 
Nonprofit Handbook: Fund Raising, Third Edition. New York, Wiley. 
Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List. (2007). “What do Laboratory Experiments 
Measuring Social Preferences tell us about the Real World,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 21 (2): 153-174. 
List, J. A.  (2006).  “Field Experiments: A Bridge between Lab and Naturally 
Occurring Data.”  Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy 6(2), 
Article 2. 
  24List, J.A. and D. Lucking-Reiley. (2002). The effects of seed money and refunds 
on charitable giving: experimental evidence from a University capital 
campaign, Journal of Political Economy 110, 215-233. 
List, J.A. and D. Rondeau. (2003) The Impact of Challenge Gifts on Charitable 
Giving: An Experimental Investigation. Economics Letters 79:153-159. 
Meier, Stephan. (2007). “Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long-
Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment.” working paper, Boston 
Federal Reserve Board. 
Randolph, W.C. (1995). Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of 
Charitable Contributions, Journal of Political Economy 103: 709-38. 
Rondeau, D., W.D Schulze and G.L. Poe. (1999). Voluntary revelation of the 
demand for public goods using a provision point mechanism, Journal of 
Public Economics 72, 455-470. 
Rondeau, D., G.L.Poe and W.D. Schulze. (2005). VCM or PPM? A Comparison 
of the Performance of Two Voluntary Public Goods Mechanisms." Journal 
of Public Economics 81:1581-92. 
Shang, Jen and Rachel Croson. (2005). “Field Experiments in Charitable 
Contribution: The Impact of Social Influence on the Voluntary Provision 
of Public Goods.” Working Paper, Wharton School of Business, 
University of Pennsylvania. 
Vesterlund. L. (2003). The informational value of sequential fundraising, Journal 
















Mean  $45.83 $43.78 $34.31 $27.79
Total Raised  $1375 $1620 $1235 $945
Median  $30 $35 $25 $25
Minimum  $5 $10 $15 $5
Maximum  $125 $250 $100 $75
Std. Deviation  $34.72 $41.09 $20.04 $14.78
Observations  30 37 36 34
Undeliverables  21 0  3
Net Response Rate  4.01% 4.94% 4.80% 4.55%
Notes:  Cells represent raw data summaries for the various treatments. “Undeliverables” 
are those letters that were returned as undeliverable, likely because the person had 
moved. 
 
  26Table 2   
Field Experiment - Pair-wise two-tailed Student’s t tests 
Probability that the Mean of Individual Contributions in the Row and Column 
Treatments are Equal  
 
 Challenge  Matching  Low  Control 
High Control   0.829 0.115  0.012 
Challenge    0.214 0.032 




Table 3   
Field Experiment - Pair-wise Two-tailed Generalized Rank-sum Tests 
Probability that the Distribution of Contributions in the Row and Column 









High Control (HC)   0.396 0.235  0.077 
Challenge (CH)   0.241 0.038 
Matching  (MA)    0.128 
 













High Control (HC)  $45  $0  $9 $0.20 48 
Challenge (CH)  $45 $22.50  $9 $0.20 48 
Matching (MA)  $45 $22.50  $9 $0.20 48 
Low Control (LC)  $22.50  $0  $9 $0.20 48 





















Mean  $7.53 $6.84  $5.76  7.33  $5.41 
Median  $8.00 $6.50  $5.50  7.00  $4.50 
Minimum  $1.00 $0.00  $0.00  1.00  $0.00 
Maximum  $12.00 $12.00  $12.00  12.00  $12.00 
Std. Dev.  $2.69 $3.40  $3.17  $3.32  $3.77 
Observations  48 48  48  48  48 
 
  28Table 6   
Laboratory Experiments Pair-wise two-tailed Student’s t tests 
Probability that the Mean of Individual Contributions in the Row and Column 









Low Control 2 
(LC2) 
High Control (HC)  0.271 0.004  0.747  0.002 
Challenge (CH)   0.111  0.474  0.055 
Matching  (MA)     0.020  0.625 
Low Control (LC)       0.010 
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